


POLITICAL & SECURITY STATEWATCH

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


Focus

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ETHNIC CONFLICT
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THE MOLDOVAN
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The Institute for Development and Social Initiatives (IDS) Viitorul is a research, education and outreach organization which activates in the field of economic analysis, governance, law, political sciences, strategic and organizational science. It was set up in June 1993 in Moldova as a nongovernmental, not-for-profit organization, nonpolitical entity.





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TARLEV'S MOVE, ETHNIC CONFLICT AND NEW WAVES OF PROTESTS

Summary

As former premier Vasile Tarlev joins an unknown party, professors and pensioners protest in front of the Government building. Is Tarlev going to oppose the Communists or it is a scenario developed by the governing party's chief political strategists? The issue of double citizenship becomes again a hot topic after two persons facing judicial trials holding both Romanian and Moldovan citizenship enter the territory of the Romanian Embassy and request diplomatic protection. Violent confrontations between two youth organizations reveal the political conflict along ethnic and language lines is a present threat in the Moldovan society.

Tarlev's move: a long-planned scenario?

Probably, we will have to wait a few months to see what stays behind Vasile Tarlev's decision to stay in politics. His move this month to join the Centrist Union of Moldova (UCM) was a rather unexpected one. Until the last moment, it was not clear whether Tarlev will join the tiny party or not. Coming late at the Congress of the party, Tarlev filled out the membership form and after a few minutes he was elected president. Everything looked like a well-designed scenario. However, stepping down, Mihai Petrache, the former leader of UCM voiced some doubts regarding Tarlev's break with the Communist leadership, which exposed former premier as being unprepared to such inquiries. Tarlev, the most long-lived prime-minister in the country's history was for seven years the head of the Communist government and virtually the most silent premier while executing orders coming from the Presidency. How close was he to the party in power? Well, even if at the last party congress

he was the one sitting closest to president of the party, he did not join the Party of Communists (PCRM).

Enjoying a popularity rate of approx. 20% due to the seven years coverage by the government-controlled media, Tarlev will try to transform popularity into votes. The polls show that it is highly improbable that the party will overcome the 6% electoral threshold. At the last local elections in 2007, UCM gained approx. 1% of the votes. Thus, it seems the only accomplishment of Tarlev's move will be more confusion among the voters, even if UCM leaders try to attract the undecided voters positioning themselves on the center of the political spectrum. In Moldova, due to the party list system, the first name on the list is usually associated with the party. But because Tarlev is associated with PCRM, it might happen that he steals votes from his former protectors. On the other hand, the re-branding needs time and with the former premier avoiding to criticize the Communists it is almost sure it will not be successful. It is probably not a coincidence that after Tarlev re-entered politics, the shareholders of Bucuria S.A. accused him of financial mismanagement and seek to bring him in front of the court. Is this going to become another case, where like many other politicians Tarlev will claim that he is politically persecuted?

The premiers in the Moldovan history were not very popular after they left the office. Another former premier, currently leader of a much stronger Social-Democratic party is Dumitru Braghis, who managed to become a MEP after heading the Government. Though, after failing to merge with the Democratic Party (PDM), it seems the Social-Democrats will head alone for the elections next year, struggling to overcome

the 6% electoral threshold. Mircea Druc, the first Moldovan premier is living and being active in Romania, while the other heads of government retreated from the political arena.

As analyzed in PSS 4 (11), the electoral threshold was firmly re-established from 4% to 6% by the Communists and Christian-Democrats in order to limit the access of the newly appeared parties seeking access to power. The new competitors are by far more active than the parliamentary parties. Consider only the initiative of liberal-democrats on the Border Traffic Agreement, the Liberal Party protests against the presence of Russian troops, numerous street protests organized by the European Action Movement. While these newly founded parties struggle for popularity and access to the few opposition media, Christian-Democrats target mainly Orthodox groups emphasizing the support of Orthodoxy in detriment of sexual minority rights. We are witnessing attempts of political parties to define their main target constituencies and to elaborate the appropriate electoral messages.

However, after eighteen years of independence, serious studies on the Moldovan party system are absent. Questions regarding the fragmentation of the party system, volatility of electoral preferences, and structure of the system remain only partially answered. A superficial assessment shows that the Moldovan party system is dominated for almost a decade by the Party of Communists flanked by smaller and weaker competitors. Among the competitors, the most important is the Our Moldova Alliance formed around the former mayor of Chisinau, Serafim Urechean. The most recent poll released by the Association of Sociologists from Moldova reveals that at the next election, PCRM will gain the greatest number of seats in the Parliament. Hence, discussions about the disappearance of PCRM from the political scene only ignore the reality. It is obvious that PCRM will not vanish as soon as once the Democratic Agrarian Party did after being four years in government. Unfortunately, for the Moldovan transition the Party of Communists became a cornerstone of the Moldovan party system, thus distorting and prolonging through contradictory policies the process of transition from Communism to democracy and market economy. It seems the party managed to find loyal supporters and already has a

stable constituency, but it fails to modernize its structure. As pointed earlier, mainly minority groups, pensioners and low-income families vote for PCRM. All these categories deserve separate attention, but for the present we will just ask one basic question: why ethnic minority groups are attracted by PCRM's discourse? Following, we try to explore possible answers.

Is ethnic conflict possible in Moldova?

Even if there are other political parties (Ravnopravie, Partia-Rodina) trying to mobilize minorities like, looking on the electoral results of the 2007 local elections and analyzing various polls one can easily observe that it is PCRM that actually attracts those votes. A tentative answer would take into account the type of multiethnic society advocated by PCRM. Immediately after coming into power PCRM tried to do some "social engineering" and to foster a multiethnic cohesive society by proposing a Soviet-based Moldovenist ideology to the Romanian-speaking population. The main target was the Romanian-speaking population that in the view of PCRM should have undergone a process of re-education after the first years of independence. At the same time, the ethnic minorities were left to find their own way of social integration. As a result the minorities did not bother to study the official language and currently, perceive such legitimate and legal demands from the side of the majority as offensive. To speak the official language did not become something usual in Moldova and as a consequence one of the main threats for the Moldovan society is at present, the split along the language criteria. During the last two decades, the Moldovan society remained divided along language lines, with the majority of Russian-speakers failing to learn Romanian and relating to Russia as motherland. The events from beginning of October in Balti, when a group of Liberal party members was attacked by a group of Russian-speaking Komsomol members (youth organization of the Communists' Party) indicate that political confrontation can easily transform in violence and physical aggression. Especially if, as in the above-mentioned case, police does not intervene, but follows rather political orders. Not only is the society divided, but the legitimacy of the Moldovan state institutions is still highly contested, a sign that the state structures do not have deep roots within the society. A

factor leading to this legitimacy deficit is the perception of the current power-holders as representing the interests of the minorities rather than of the majority. It is difficult to ask for the bureaucracy to be efficient in a country where the legitimacy of the state institutions is under constant scrutiny.


Protests intensify as elections approach

Mass protests are not frequent in Moldova. Trade-unions are either subject to political control or are not well-organized. Most of them have either material demands or political. Tens of teachers and professors staged already a few rallies and promised to continue if their wages would not be increased by 40%. An increase, which is not likely to occur during the next months. Pensioners continue their protests with the backing of the Salvagardare non-governmental organization that is one of the few representing elderly people. Prices for gas and healthcare are rising and in trying to diminish the social tensions before the elections, the Government promised certain salary and pension increases. From the politically-motivated protests, it is worth mentioning the case of the European Action Movement. The European Action Movement led protests in front of the Ministry of Justice, because the latter refused to register the party statute of the movement. Before the 2007 elections, the same story went on, but surprisingly the European Action Movement won the case at the Supreme Court and was registered. Still, too late to take part in the elections. Sexual minority rights determined several Orthodox organizations to protest during last months demanding the rejection of the provisions regarding sexual orientation from the Law on Discrimination.

But certainly the most symbolic protest was the unauthorized access of the Mocanu brothers on the territory of the Romanian Embassy. Holding Romanian and Moldovan citizenship, sons of former presidential adviser and politician Sergiu Mocanu were accused of beating a person one month ago. However, they deny doing that and say this was a personal revenge of president Voronin for the defection of their father from his administration. They announced they would renounce to the Moldovan citizenship, if they continue to be prosecuted by the party in government.

Prognosis

Certainly, the political activity will become more intense. The date of elections was not yet announced, but the Electoral Commission is already training the electoral officials. As alliances are not possible under the current strict electoral laws adopted in spring 2008, parties will try to negotiate mergers. Still, it is more difficult to negotiate mergers than alliances, thus we will witness desperate campaign efforts of the smaller parties interfering with one another. Following the example of the Liberal Party that does not have a wide access to the media, more parties will try to reach out the voters directly. Protests will intensify as well as inflationist pressures, but the likelihood of mass protests is small since the opposition forces are very divided and Moldovan trade-unions are rather politically controlled. Even if there is no evidence that the international financial crisis, currently affects the Moldovan economy, we will witness the indirect impact of it during the next months or on the long term. Some indirect consequences might be decreasing foreign direct investments, returning migrants, less remittances from abroad and impossibility of international loans.



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POOR EUROPEAN SECURITY BOUNCES MOLDOVA'S EUROPEAN CHANCES

Summary

The events in Georgia triggered a series of changes, each of them of different magnitude. The most important issue on the "European" table is now how to ensure the security on the continent. Besides the nucleus comprising the European states, EU and NATO members, there is Russia, a key player in the European security arrangements. In spite of institutionalized ties between Russian Federation and NATO, their visions on European security seem to be hardly reconciled. The war in Georgia brought these divergences in front of the scene as well as the whole issue about the frozen conflicts in the region.

Following these developments, the EU involuntarily is compelled to draw on different scenarios which have to contain the rising Russian appetite for gaining more influence and decision power in matters related to energy and security. These scenarios, even if whispered with have a voice, do take into consideration the possibility of offering a clear European perspective for states which are under a direct "threat" from Russia - Ukraine and Moldova in the first place, as well as Georgia and Azerbaijan in the second. Therefore, Moldova could undeservedly benefit from such an international context and push the integration issue through. For this to happen, paradoxically, the European insecurity is a must. Only in such a way the EU could rally around the flag and try to incorporate its neighbors. Surprisingly enough, confrontation between Rus-

sia and the EU is proportionally beneficial for Moldova's European perspectives.

Back-Door Entrance Becoming a Custom for Moldova?

The '90s were for Moldova a period of affirmation. The priority of foreign policy was to ensure a wide recognition of state independence and good relations with all the states of the world. This conceptualization of Moldovan foreign policy translated into a massive adherence to different international organizations. As a consequence, the issue of good and efficient representation into these organizations became a utopia with quite dishonorable repercussions for the image and prestige of the state - debts cumulated after not paying the member fees in the organizations Moldova was part of.

At the end of the '90s, when Moldova got more diplomatic experience, the promotion of foreign policy goals changed to what can be called "use the circumstances at maximum, everything can work out". This is the case with Moldova being offered the membership in the Stability Pact for South-eastern Europe, an organization created for the Balkan countries to prepare them for joining the EU. In spite of Moldova not meeting the joining criteria, its diplomacy succeeded to use the back-door to enter the organization. More than that, even arguments proving the geographical belonging to the respective region were found in order to support these efforts. Thus, Moldova was able to get into different important in-

stitutions without actually deserving it, both given to non-meeting the objective criteria and for not trying to meet them afterwards.

The EU however is not the same thing as the Stability Pact and there will not be enough just a syrupy diplomatic discourse and trickery to get in. Nevertheless, the situation may turn in the right way if the things will not be fully settled in the Caucasus and Russia continues to display an aggressive behavior towards its "near abroad". Moreover, the EU expects a continuation of reforms in Moldova and on the eve of a new contractual agreement, with an eye back to Russia, Brussels may take an epochal decision and sign an association agreement with Chisinau authorities.

The party in power seeks such an evolution of the matters since its credibility is shattered in the eyes of the electorate, as well as those of European institutions. In order to hope for redemption, the Communists must possess a strong electoral promise. The old one which was one of the engines in the previous campaigns, resolution of Transnistrian conflict, does not hold anymore. Notwithstanding the somehow humble initiatives to reopen the talks, the situation remains uncertain. That is why the Communist leadership cannot claim it once again as an electoral promise. Instead, a resounding victory on the western front, an association agreement with the EU would skyrocket the chances of the party in power to win another mandate.

In this context, one can notice an amplification of contacts at a high level with the EU member states. First of all, this is valid for France who holds the presidency of EU at the moment. A meeting of heads of Departments from the Foreign Ministries of the two states was meant to reinsure the European aspirations of Moldova and the support of the French government for the efforts Moldova is undertaking towards it. Second, the Czech foreign minister visited Chisinau and met with the Prime Minister Greceanii to discuss a set of issues among which European integration and more important, the Czech official requested the withdrawal of Russian troops from Transnistria, a way to re-establish Moldova's territorial integrity and sovereignty. Thirdly, a twinning project has

been launched in Moldova, with the sponsorship of the EU and implemented together with the French and Hungarian parliamentarians. Even if Moldova is not an EU candidate country, the project was placed under the umbrella of European Neighborhood Policy. Fourthly, and the most important, Moldova has asked through the mouth of his Foreign Minister an Association Agreement with the EU, plus no more, no less - to be granted the candidate status. While it can sound and actually is, an exaggerated request, at least it makes clear for the EU that Moldova has bluntly put forward its ambitions. Whether to honor those ambitions or to leave them just ambitions, it is to be decided after the European Commission will get the mandate to start the negotiations for the new contractual agreement with Moldova.

As one might see, these are small, but important steps which are meant to forge a close relationship with Moldova on behalf of EU and its member states. Still wary of the fact that hurrying is not the case, the EU is looking forward to see how well Moldova can cope with the requirements it had been tasked. Once again, the "plan" is to wait until the elections will be carried out, either democratically or with frauds. Then it is salient to see the composition of the new government as well as continuity to the European course of the country combined with a strong commitment for the European norms and values and their transposition in the field.

Nevertheless, the foxes of Moldovan foreign policy might have sensed that now it is the moment to push it as the European security has been shaken and the feeling of insecurity involuntarily creates a state of uncertainty. To counter such "feelings" the "actor" has to find certainty and security in allying itself with or to somebody. However in the case of Moldova it could be entirely something else. Bringing Moldova closer, the EU could shield itself from Russia. A perfect solution for EU would be to repeat the Turkish scenario - making Moldova an ever associate country, nurturing it with promises of membership, but in reality using it to "contain" Russia. Turkey probably serves the EU to shield itself from the rest of the Muslim world, while Moldova cannot do it with regard to Russia. Instead it could work if to add Ukraine.

In the end one has an awkward theory, but which if to look deeply into it, one might find it realistic. If the Baltic countries have been lost for Russia during its moments of "weakness", it cannot allow itself to lose Ukraine and Moldova in the same way. Therefore, these two countries are slowly, but firmly becoming a huge battleground between the EU and Russia. On the one hand Russia would do everything to not let them join the EU, on the other the EU is not capable of entirely absorbing them. Struck with such a perspective, it seems that repeating "Turkish" scenario is the most adequate solution.

Moldova's interests however have to be clearly followed. The type of theories described above can be proved or disproved only in time. Hence, the time will show if decisions taken in the present were right or wrong. In spite of the circumstances, Moldova has to deserve to be granted a candidate status through hard work and not through the back-door. Who enters this type of doors will finally end by exiting the same door later on.

Moldova and Protection of Human Rights

The issue of human rights has become a millstone for Moldova dragging it further on from developing into a modern and democratic state. The cases against Moldova at the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) have increased dramatically in the last years. The monitoring period on behalf of Council of Europe (CoE) has been extended as well, one of the reasons being the same human rights which are not respected. Just to recall, Moldova became a member of CoE in 1995 and, today, in 2008 it is still under the monitoring of this organization. This means that in 13 years Moldova failed to align itself to the criteria and commitments it had signed to respect.

The problem is however more complex. The judiciary lost its independence, its verticality falling into the hands of the executive power and of the party exercising that power, namely the Communists Party. As a consequence the citizens are denied one of their basic rights enshrined in the Constitution – the right to a free and fair trial. When people find themselves with a subjective and unfair court deci-

sion, even after going through all the stages, up to the Supreme Court, their only way out is to plead at the ECHR. The statistics show that majority who addressed the court in a trial against the state Republic of Moldova won those cases. This led some time ago even to a stupid declaration of president Voronin that Moldova has to leave CoE because the state loses its prestige and the state budget has to suffer from ECHR decisions, which are compulsory for the member states. In fact, the prestige is lost when cases unresolved by the state judicial structures are being submitted to Strasbourg. If these cases are lost by the state, it already shows serious problems with the state of democracy within the state structures.

With all this obvious truth, the situation does not get better, Moldovan human rights record remaining one of the poorest in Europe. In spite of the too many declarations made by high officials that protection of human rights is a priority, nothing actually happens in the field. Citizens do not have confidence in justice and feel that the state or its structures will always be in the position to influence the decisions in the court in its favor.

Besides the CoE, the European Parliament is also keeping an eye on the respect of human rights in Moldova. At a recent meeting of the Parliamentary Cooperation Committee EU-Moldova, the Moldovan delegation led by Grigore Petrenco could not adequately answer the questions of European MPs with regard to protection of human rights and declared that the reports of the international organizations in the field are exaggerated and should not be trusted. Therefore, the authorities deny the competence of internationally recognized organizations which have a tremendous experience in monitoring the situation of human rights protection in the world.

Confronted with such a problem, Moldova cannot hope of being treated as a future candidate for EU accession, where human rights are one of the basic criteria for acceptance. Thus, the efforts of the authorities have to be multiplied in order to ensure that these rights are observed and respected. Of course, there is a long way to go, but this is the one of the keys to the doors leading to European integration.

Prognosis

The war in Georgia created a situation that Moldova could benefit from. A state of insecurity in Europe made EU to think about unresolved frozen conflicts and ensuring security by encompassing the countries faced with such problems. The problem actually lies in the new rise of Russian power and the fear of being confronted, directly with this power. In such a situation, the EU could experiment a “Turkish” scenario which means to bring Moldova and Ukraine close as “ever accession candidates” in order to shield itself from Russia. This theory does not very much apply to a post-modern entity as the EU, however when faced with a modern state like Russia acting in the fashion of *realpolitik*, the only solution is to use the same weapons the adversary is turning against you.

Nevertheless, one can predict that after bluntly asking for an accession agreement and recogni-

tion of a candidate status from EU, the authorities will keep on doing it again and again. At stake is the popularity of the party in power who desperately needs good news. Making as an electoral promise an accession agreement with the EU would bounce the Communists in the polls. The reverse is that making empty promises and lying to the citizens would severely damage the electoral results of the ruling party. Till the end of the year there will be other several meetings with the European officials after which it will become clear what is the position of EU towards Moldovan ambitious requests.

With the electoral campaign getting tighter and tighter the public will assist at a wide range of promises, including foreign policy objectives nobody thought of. The important thing is to discern the truth and reality through the many tools the public can use: the media, the reports from outside the country and the position of the major actors in the region towards the Moldovan parties.



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THE UNCERTAINTY AND NON-DEMOCRACY OF THE MOLDOVAN SECURITY POLICY – A SOURCE OF NATIONAL AND REGIONAL INSECURITY

Summary

The meeting between the President of the Russian Federation, D Medvedev and the separatist leader, I. Smirnov, ended with the renewal of the discussions related to the transnistrian settlement. The Western and Ukrainian insistence to restart the 5 plus 2 negotiation format, and the re-engagement of the Republic of Moldova's authorities to respect this format emphasized the lack of wish from the Tiraspol part to accept the extended negotiation format and the initial Chisinau proposals.

The appeal from September 9, 2008 of the UTAG Popular Assembly of recognizing by the Parliament and Republic of Moldova's President the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia emphasizes the complexity of the different opinions between those two entities, but also the effects of the lack of coherence of the state's security policy, as well as the effects of the government party interest and national interests interfusion. The actions of the gagauz authorities emphasized the deep lacks of the state's policy in developing a functional dialogue with the gagauz population authorities.

The fining of some people at the end of September for hoisting the Romanian flag during the national holiday, the journalists' intimidation for presenting some investigations that impleads the Republic of Moldova's intelligent services, as well as the attempts to blur the development of the cooperation relations of the Republic of Moldova's and Romanian communities are subscribed to the logic of communist authorities undemocratic security policy that

contributes to the insecurity increase of the Moldovan citizens and supposes the risk of affecting the inter-state Moldo-Romanian relations.

The risks of unilateral negotiation approach

The unfolding of the meeting on September 3, 2008, in Soci between the Russian Federation's president, D Medvedev, and the separatist leader I. Smirnov, led to the canceling of the separatist's moratoria regarding the relations with Chisinau and the declaration of the availability related to the transnistrian conflict settlement. We have to mention that according to the separatist leader, Tiraspol is ready to begin once again the discussions in the trilateral format, Moscow, Chisinau and Tiraspol.

The actions of the Chisinau communist authorities proved out to be quite loyal towards such evolutions and presented a simplistic approach of the current situation. So, except restarting the "trilateral consultations" by Chisinau, we could remember the fact that the prime-minister of Republic of Moldova stated in a public statement, the Chisinau's availability to take over some elements of the Kozak Plan without saying which one.

The ambiguous behavior of the Chisinau authorities from the beginning of September that didn't stated clearly the format in which a decision regarding the negotiations will be taken generated profound worries of the Moldavian society that considered the trilateral discussion increase as a major source of society insecurity. In this way, it is representative the Experts Vision related the Transnistrian problem from

11.09.2008, in which are mentioned the risks towards the national security that come from the Chisinau and Kremlin direct unilateral discussions.

Thus, we have to take into consideration the double-faced, and non transparent behavior of the Chisinau authorities, that served as a source of insecurity not only for the Moldovan society but also generated insecurity at the regional level. So, the official visit of the Ukrainian vice-minister of foreign affairs, Alexandr Gorin, and of the special representative of Ukraine in the transnistrian settlement negotiation process, dl. Victor Krijanovci, on September 12, may be considered a visit with the purpose to inform regarding the current situation of the negotiations and its evolutions, as well as a reaction in order to prevent some unwished evolutions in the current discussion round centered on trilateral dialogue. Or, the transnistrian conflict represents a source of threat not only for Republic of Moldova, but also directly for Ukraine that is willing to adhere to EU and NATO.

The uncertainty of the Chisinau authorities toward the Russian Federation and Transnistrian attempt to compromise the negotiation in the format 5 plus 2 determined the direct and deep involvement of the European authorities. In this regard, we have to remember Philip Remler's visit and his meeting with the speaker of the Republic of Moldova's Parliament on September 15, and the statements of Marianne Mikko on September 17, related to the functionality of the 5 plus 2 negotiation format. In such a framework, it was easier for the Chisinau authorities to comeback to normal, and as a result of the European support were made a series of statements regarding the fact that it is necessary to restart and respect the 5plus 2 negotiation format. The clear statement of the Chisinau authorities regarding respecting the extended negotiation process made Transnistria no longer interested in continuing the discussions. Postponing the meeting from September 25 between the president of the country and the separatist leader for an indefinite period of time, as well as Smirnov's and other representatives of the separatist officials statements regarding the necessity of recognizing the independence of Transnistria argues the lack of interest in continuing

the discussions related to problem settlement. Such a behavior of the separatist authorities corresponds totally to the Russia's interests of compromising the Western involvement transnistrian settlement.

We should remember the fact that in such a framework it is important not to sign a document that would resume at some declarative principles but a document that would set up real conditions of settling the conflict by promoting reforms and increasing the attractiveness of the Republic of Moldova. But at this chapter the communist authorities are not doing very well. Plus, in the framework of the future 2009 elections it seems that the communist authorities are more willing to sign a document, even with the risk of being a declarative one, instead of setting up a long period strategy based on reforms and durability in order to settle the conflict.

The continuation of the gagauz offensive

On September 19, 2008, the UTAG Popular Assembly asked from the Chisinau authorities the recognition of the Abkhasia and South Ossetia independence by sending an appeal to the president of the Republic of Moldova and the Parliament. Here we mention that the Popular Assembly's action directly oriented to excelling the legal framework of gagauz autonomy's functioning and represents a provocation to the national politics security and stability. The action of the gagauz authorities represent the continuation of a behavior that could have as an objective revising the current situation of the gagauz autonomy, statements in this regard being made by representatives of the autonomy at different levels on July 2008 during the protest movements in Comrat, and it seems that the conflicts between the UTAG authorities and Chisinau communist authorities continue.

Although the Republic of Moldova's authorities ignored the actions of the UTAG's authorities stating that their appeal is not important and doesn't have any judicial value, the current situation demonstrates the unpleasant state of the Moldovan authorities and denotes additional pressures on Chisinau in the conditions of deepening the discussions with Transnistria. In this

framework, we should pay attention to the fact that the gagauz position is closer event the same with Russia's, then to the official position of Chisinau, and such a reality needs a more careful approach of the transnistrian conflict settlement the relations with Comrat and the role of the informational space security.

We have to mention that the events in Georgia, as well the attitude of the society in general toward the Russian Federation's actions denotes the excessive role of the Russian mass-media in forming the public opinion in Republic of Moldova as well as in UTAG. In this way, the relations between Chisinau and Comrat in the absence of a truthful and continue dialogue between the two entities, as well as in an informational space dominated by the Russian media determines additional risks to the national security.

With the risky political evolutions in UTAG, when there are made declarations regarding the necessity of revising the judicial statute of the autonomy, and obtaining the statute of Republic (analyzed in previous numbers of PSS) and the appeals that excel the legal attributions of the autonomy's authorities, we have to recall that the legal structures of the Republic of Moldova found during the last half of the month arms stocks. Such a discovery was made on September 4, and the arms stock had grenades and munitions destined to destroy armored techniques and buildings. Although it is practically impossible to make a link between the dynamics of the political processes in the region and this event, thus, such evolutions should make the Chisinau authorities more responsible regarding the UTAG policy and its integration in the social, economic and political area of the Republic of Moldova.

The promotion of a non democratic policy with xenophobia elements

The discussions above the transnistrian conflict and the Caucasian events captured the attention of the Moldovan public, making it possible to skip some events, usually very sensitive and keen in the security policy promoted by communistic government from Chisinau. Thus, police and security structures confiscated the

Romanian flag, arresting and fining by a court of law decision the owner during the national language day on August 31st, celebrated in the square of the Great, National Assembly.

Such a behavior of the communist authorities doesn't look to be a unique action; it is a well organized and staged policy. Here we could recall the confining of a batch of Romanian book by the customs services of the Republic of Moldova, given by the authorities from Calarashi, Romania to their colleges from Republic of Moldova. According to the Chief of the Culture Department from Calarashi statement, involved in managing the crisis, the custom service authorities appealed to some acts adopted by Moldovan Ministry of Education, that allow such kind of illegal actions.

Also here can be added the Declaration signed on September 12 by a group of NGO's, representative for the Moldovan mass media. The organizations express their worries regarding those actions of intimidation and harassment, reported by the journalists from the weekly newspaper "Ziarul de Garda" that investigates a possible involvement of the Republic of Moldova's Intelligence Services in attracting young students, citizens of the Republic of Moldova that are studying in Romania.

In this way, it looks that the communist authorities still practice the persecution of people who try to defend their national identity and the right to free conscience, or the above mentioned actions seem like a continuation of giving ideology policy elements on issues related to national history and language.

In this framework, the actions of the communist authorities represent real provocations towards Romania and contribute to the destabilization of the Moldo-Romanian relations that are fragile enough, and this fact determines deep negative consequences over Moldova's national security of.

Prognosis

Russian intention to rule the transnistrian conflict was proved by Medvedev when he quickly convinced the leader from Tiraspol to resume

the discussions above it. It is expected that Russia will continue promoting the necessity of loyal discussions in its interests favor by promoting a harsh position towards Transnistria, but also a possible compromising or boycotting of the Western and Ukrainian involvement.

In spite the optimistic statement of the President Voronin, the event from the end of the month seem to prove the lack of means in order to impose the Republic of Moldova's proposals and the lack of interest of the Russian federation in order to accept them. In such a framework the discussions will be uncertain and the risk of blocking them from minor reasons is very high, it having deep conflicts of principles behind.

In the framework of the UTAG authorities statements it is expected that the communist authori-

ties will still ignore them. Avoiding the development of a real dialogue with the autonomy's authorities, as well as with its population will make UTAG to organize once again provocative actions. Also it is expected that the Russia and Transnistria will increase its effort to use Gagauzia in order to make pressures on Chisinau and intimidate it during the current round of discussions.

On issues related to national identity it is expected that the communist authorities won't be able to change their attitude in promoting a balanced policy, oriented to respect the citizens' right. They will continue to use practices of people and organizations intimidation even with the risk or the hope to affect the Moldo-Romanian inter-state relations

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